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Evolution, providence, and Gouldian
contingency
MICHAEL ROTA
Department of Philosophy, 241 JRC, University of St Thomas, 2115 Summit Ave, St Paul,
MN 55105
Abstract: Stephen Jay Gould and others have argued that what we know about
evolution implies that human beings are a ‘cosmic accident’. In this paper I examine
an argument for Gould’s view and then attempt to show that it fails. Contrary to the
claims of Gould, Daniel Dennett, and others, it is a mistake to think that what we
have learned from evolutionary biology somehow shows that human beings are
mere accidents of natural history. Nor does what we know about the contingency of
evolution give us good reason to reject the view that human beings came to be
according to a divine providential plan.
According to traditional Christian notions of divine providence, the ulti-
mate explanation of the existence of human beings has to do with the purposes of
God: God wanted us to exist, in order that we might freely choose to enter into
personal communion with Him and other persons. We are the result of the pur-
pose and plan of a supernatural being. Is this view – the view that human beings
are the intended product of a divine plan – compatible with the deliverances of
contemporary evolutionary biology?
It might seem that the answer is ‘No’. According to the late paleontologist
Stephen Jay Gould, human beings are a ‘momentary cosmic accident’,1 even if a
‘glorious accident’.2 Gould supports this claim by arguing for the radical con-
tingency of the human species. Summing up his view, he writes: ‘Wind back the
tape of life to the early days of the Burgess Shale; let it play again from an ident-
ical starting point, and the chance becomes vanishingly small that anything like
human intelligence would grace the replay. ’3
Gould is not alone in holding that what we know about evolution4 provides
strong evidence that human beings are not the result of any divine purpose or
plan. In the opinion of philosopher Daniel Dennett, a key feature of Darwinism is
the idea that evolution is ‘an algorithmic process’, which implies that the under-
lying process of evolution ‘consists of nothing but a set of individually mindless
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steps succeeding each other without the help of any intelligent supervision; they
are ‘‘automatic’’ by deﬁnition: the workings of an automaton’.5 The evolutionary
process, Dennett contends, is mindless and mechanical, nor was it itself de-
signed. Noting the dazzling complexity of the biological world, Dennett asks:
‘Can [the biosphere] really be the outcome of nothing but a cascade of algor-
ithmic processes feeding on chance? And if so, who designed that cascade?’
His answer: ‘Nobody. It is itself the product of a blind, algorithmic process. ’6
And again, ‘Evolution is not a process that was designed to produce us. ’7 On
Dennett’s view, a proper understanding of evolution rules out the thesis that
humans were intentionally produced in accordance with a divine plan.8
In this paper I argue that Gould and Dennett are mistaken. In the ﬁrst section I
develop Gould’s ideas about the contingency of the evolutionary process in order
to construct an argument that human beings are not an intended product of
some divine plan. In the second I attempt to show that this argument fails to
establish its conclusion.
The Gouldian contingency argument
If there were a God, it might be said, He either could not or would not have
intended to use an evolutionary process to bring about the existence of humans.
Two reasons might support this objection, one concerning the problem of evil,
the other concerning the contingency of the evolutionary process. It might be
thought, ﬁrst, that the evolutionary process involves too much violence and suf-
fering to be a suitable method for God to employ.9 Second, it could be claimed
that the evolutionary process is too contingent to be the sort of process that God
could have used to bring about the existence of humans. In this paper I examine
this second claim.
Consider again Gould’s view that if we were to wind back ‘the tape of life to the
early days of the Burgess Shale’, and let it play again from the same starting point,
then the chance that ‘anything like human intelligence would grace the replay’
would be ‘vanishingly small ’.10 Suppose this is true, or suppose that at the time
when life ﬁrst appeared on Earth, the objective probability was exceedingly small
that the evolutionary process would someday yield the generation of human
beings. Then the claim that God planned to produce humans via the evolutionary
process would seem quite implausible. It would be similar to the claim of a lottery
winner that he had planned to win the lottery. On this view the coming to be of
humans via an evolutionary process could not be part of a divine plan, because it
could not have been expected or reliably predicted in advance.
We can make this argument rigorous as follows:
(1) The objective probability, at the time of the appearance of life
on Earth, that human beings would someday be produced by
394 MICHAEL ROTA
an evolutionary process (of the sort we have evidence of) is
extremely low.11
(2) If the objective probability is extremely low that a particular outcome
O would someday be produced by a process P, then a rational agent
intending to bring about O could not (or at least would not, if other
alternatives were available) plan to bring about O by means of P.
Thus,
(3) A rational agent intending to bring about the existence of human
beings could not (or at least would not, if other alternatives were
available) plan to bring about the existence of human beings by
means of an evolutionary process (of the sort we have evidence of).
God, of course, is supposed to be the supremely rational agent. And being
omnipotent, God would have had other alternatives available. So,
(4) If God had intended to bring about the existence of human beings,
then God would not have planned to bring about the existence of
human beings by means of an evolutionary process (of the sort we
have evidence of).
In other words, if it were the case that the existence of human beings was
intended by God, then God would not have used an evolutionary process (of the
sort we have evidence of). So if the existence of human beings had been part of
some divine plan, then it would not be the case that human beings came to be via
an evolutionary process. But human beings have come to be via an evolutionary
process. Thus, it can’t very well be the case that the existence of human beings
was part of a divine plan. And this entails that:
(5) Human beings are not the product of a divine plan.
Response to the contingency argument
This line of reasoning faces at least two major diﬃculties, both concerning
the crucial empirical premise of the argument, proposition (1). In what follows I
shall try to show that the Gouldian contingency argument is unsuccessful in es-
tablishing its conclusion. What we know about the contingency of evolution does
not give us good reason to aﬃrm that human beings are a mere accident, nor
does it give us good reason to reject the view that human beings are the product
of a divine plan.
Questioning Gouldian contingency
Premise (1) in the contingency argument makes a claim about human
beings. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that we grant the truth of (1) as applied
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to the biological species homo sapiens, i.e. suppose we grant that it was extremely
unlikely for evolution to yield the bipedal, relatively hairless, ﬁve-ﬁngered beings
that we are. The probability still might have been quite high that some species of
rational animal would some day be produced by the evolutionary process. And
perhaps what was eﬃcaciously intended by God was not the emergence of the
biological species homo sapiens, but simply some species of rational animal or
another. Such a species could be very diﬀerent than homo sapiens in terms of
physical features, but would be similar in possessing the capacity for abstract
thought, free choice, and an understanding of morality.
If a theist asserts that God intended for human beings to come to be via an
evolutionary process, that theist might mean either of two things. She might be
committed to the view that God intended that the particular species homo
sapiens emerge from an evolutionary process. But she might be committed only
to the view that God intended that some species of rational animal emerge from
the evolutionary process. Indeed, there is a long tradition in philosophy of
deﬁning a human being as a rational animal. Consider also the biblical claim that
human beings are made in the image of God.12 In virtue of what, exactly, are
humans made in the image of God? Not in virtue of being bipedal, relatively
hairless, and having ﬁve ﬁngers on each hand. Human beings are made in the
image of God in virtue of their rationality, in virtue of their possession of intellect
and free will. Such is one traditional position, anyway. The inﬂuential eighth-
century theologian John of Damascus taught that human beings are ‘in the image
of God’ in virtue of intellect and free will.13 For Aquinas, too, human beings are
said to be ‘in the image of God’ on account of their intellectual nature.14 Aquinas
expressly denies that the image of God is in human beings with respect to the
body.15
It follows that rational animals with physical characteristics diﬀerent from
those of homo sapiens would also be made in the image of God (in virtue of being
rational). And it could be that God’s intention was simply to ensure the emerg-
ence of some embodied being made in God’s image, i.e. some rational animal or
another. Call this the broad view of God’s providential plan, as opposed to the
narrow view which holds that God’s intention was to ensure the emergence of
homo sapiens.
The Gouldian contingency argument, as I’ve stated it, is ambiguous about the
meaning of ‘human beings’. The conclusion could be taken to mean either,
(5a) Rational animals are not the product of a divine plan.
Or,
(5b) The biological species homo sapiens is not the product of a divine
plan.
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Let’s take each possibility in turn. In order for the argument to successfully
establish (5a), the ﬁrst premise would have to be changed to:
(1a) The objective probability, at the time of the appearance of life on
Earth, that some species of rational animal would someday be
produced by an evolutionary process (of the sort we have evidence
of) is extremely low.16
Call the argument that results frommaking similar changes to the other premises
the broad version of the Gouldian contingency argument.17 Note that this argu-
ment cannot be successful unless (1a) is on solid ground. But is it?
According to the now well-known work of Simon Conway Morris, it is not.18 On
the contrary, thinks Conway Morris, the empirical evidence is against (1a) rather
than for it :
[I]t is now widely thought that the history of life is little more than a contingent muddle
punctuated by disastrous mass extinctions that in spelling the doom of one group so
open the doors of opportunity to some other mob of lucky-chancers. … Rerun the tape
of the history of life, as S. J. Gould would have us believe, and the end result will be
an utterly diﬀerent biosphere. Most notably there will be nothing remotely like
a human… . Yet, what we know of evolution suggests the exact reverse: convergence is
ubiquitous and the constraints of life make the emergence of the various biological
properties [e.g. intelligence] very probable, if not inevitable.19
As Conway Morris puts it in another place, ‘something like ourselves is an
evolutionary inevitability’.20
The key to Conway Morris’s argument has to do with evolutionary conver-
gence, ‘ the recurrent tendency of biological organization to arrive at the same
‘‘solution’’ to a particular ‘‘need’’ ’.21 Natural selection has a way of repeatedly
arriving at functionally similar features or faculties, even when beginning from
very diﬀerent starting points. This is so especially when there are strong con-
straints on what sort of feature or faculty could possibly be successful in ‘solving’
some adaptive ‘problem’. For example, there may well be a limited number of
ways in which eyes can possibly work,22 and upon analysis it appears that the
camera-eyes of vertebrates are better than the compound eyes of most insects, at
least when it comes to their ability to improve the ﬁtness of an organism with
some level of sentience.23 It’s therefore not surprising that the camera-eye has
evolved independently at least six diﬀerent times24 (in the vertebrates, the ad-
vanced cephalopods (e.g. squid and octopus), multiple times in the gastropods
(snails), and in somemarine annelids (close relatives to the earthworms).25 It is as
if natural selection explores adaptive space and repeatedly hits upon highly suc-
cessful outcomes.
Conway Morris gives numerous examples of convergence, including the inde-
pendent evolution of agriculture (among ants and humans), large brains (among
primates and the toothed whales), intelligence (in various levels among numerous
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species), tool-use (in crows, primates, dolphins, and possibly even wasps), and
the cultural transmission of behaviours (among more than one type of hominoid,
whales, and possibly some birds).26 Given these and other considerations, he ar-
gues that it was highly probable that something like human intelligence would
eventually emerge in the course of evolution on Earth.
Now, if Conway Morris is right, (1a) is false, and the broad version of the
Gouldian contingency argument fails to establish (5a). At this point a defender of
Gould might note that some biologists have criticized Conway Morris’s position,
andmight object that because ConwayMorris’s case has not been proven, my use
of his work to rebut the broad version of the Gouldian contingency argument is
unsuccessful. But here there would be a confusion about the burden of proof. We
do not need to know that Conway Morris is correct to see that his work undercuts
the broad Gouldian argument. Whether or not Conway Morris is in the end cor-
rect, his work shows that the current state of scientiﬁc evidence is such that (1a) is
by no means a solidly established scientiﬁc claim. Work on evolutionary con-
vergence casts serious doubt on (1a), and this means that the broad version of the
Gouldian contingency argument has a dubious premise. Gould’s argument would
only be convincing if (1a) were solidly established, which it is not. The broad
version of the Gouldian contingency argument therefore does not succeed in
giving us a good reason to accept (5a).
Things don’t fare much better for (5b). In order for the Gouldian contingency
argument to establish (5b), we would (at the least) need to replace the mention of
human beings in the argument with mention of homo sapiens (or in some other
way specify that when ‘human beings’ is used in the argument, it is to be
understood in such a way that human beings are essentially members of the
species homo sapiens). Call the argument resulting from such replacements the
narrow version of the Gouldian contingency argument. Even if that argument’s
ﬁrst two premises (call them (1b) and (2b)) are granted, the narrow argument is
still unsuccessful, because (5b) does not follow from those premises.
Suppose it is granted that God did not intend that the species homo sapiens
rather than some other species of rational animal emerge from the evolutionary
process. That is, suppose the scope of God’s intention was such that the state-
ment ‘God precisely intended that the particular species homo sapiens emerge
from the evolutionary process’ is false. It does not follow that:
(5b) The biological species homo sapiens is not the product of a divine
plan.
To see this, consider an analogy. Suppose the board of directors of the Ford
Motor Company wants Ford to produce a new car, in order to ﬁll the emerging
niche in the market for fuel-eﬃcient gas-electric hybrids. The board instructs
Ford’s CEO to produce a vehicle under that description. Two years later, the CEO
returns to the board with the announcement that Ford has just rolled out their
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new hybrid, a four-door sedan which gets forty-ﬁve miles to the gallon. Now, it
was not within the scope of the board’s intention that the new car be a four-door
sedan rather than a two-door sport coupe´, a station-wagon, or something else.
So the statement that ‘The board precisely intended that the particular type
a four-door sedan hybrid emerge from the engineering and production process’
is false. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which it is true that ‘Ford’s production
of their new four-door sedan was intended by the board of directors’. And it is
even more clearly true that ‘Ford’s new four-door sedan is the product of a plan
initiated by the board of directors. ’
Analogously, suppose God intends that the evolutionary process give rise
to some species of rational animal or another, but does not speciﬁcally intend
that that species be homo sapiens. If, as it turns out, homo sapiens does indeed
arise, it is still true to say that ‘Homo sapiens is the product of a plan initiated
by God.’ The further proposition that the very same plan of God might have
resulted in some other species of rational animal does not imply that homo
sapiens is not the product of a divine plan, any more than the proposition that
the very same plan of the board of directors might have resulted in Ford’s pro-
ducing some other type of fuel-eﬃcient vehicle implies that Ford’s new car was
not the product of a plan initiated by the board of directors. So (5b) does not
follow from its premises. (1b) could be true, but if (1a) were false, then (5b) could
well be false.
The ambiguity in the Gouldian contingency argument relating to the meaning
of ‘human beings’ can be resolved in either of two ways. If it is resolved in the ﬁrst
way (by deﬁning human beings as rational animals), then the ﬁrst premise is
dubious. If it is resolved in the second way (by deﬁning human beings as mem-
bers of the species homo sapiens), then the argument is invalid.
The chess-master view of God’s providence over evolution
Premise (1) of the Gouldian contingency argument has a second problem,
even if we take it in the narrow sense of :
(1b) The objective probability, at the time of the appearance of life on
Earth, that the biological species homo sapiens would someday be
produced by an evolutionary process (of the sort we have evidence
of) is extremely low.
Towards showing this, let me distinguish between: (i) epistemic in-
determinacy, and (ii) objective or ontological indeterminacy. To say that the
outcome of some process is epistemically indeterministic is to say that the out-
come cannot be predicted in advance. What is and what is not epistemically
indeterministic will be agent-relative: what is unpredictable for one agent might
be predictable for another. Ontological indeterminacy has to do not with an
agent’s knowledge about some process, but with the nature of the process itself.
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In this sense of ‘indeterminacy’, an indeterministically produced event is an
event that is caused but not guaranteed by its causes.
Suppose that some event E is caused by some number of causal factors. And
suppose we ask, ‘Given that all those causal factors occurred, and given that the
causal laws arewhat they actually are, and given that everything else causally ante-
cedent to E happened just as it actually happened, did E have to occur?’ Holding
ﬁxed the causally relevant antecedents of E, was the occurrence of E meta-
physically necessary? If the answer is ‘Yes’, then E is a deterministically pro-
duced event. If the answer is ‘No’, then E is an indeterministically produced event.
Now, the Gouldian contingency argument depends on the thesis that there is
real ontological indeterminacy in the physical world. In a deterministic world,
the way the evolutionary process in fact turned out is the way that it had to turn
out. So if there is no ontological indeterminacy, (1), (1a), and (1b) are all false. The
contingency argument therefore requires the assumption that there is real, ob-
jective indeterminacy in the physical world. Also required is the assumption that
this indeterminacy can percolate up (say, from the quantum level) in such a way
as to have an eﬀect on the course of macro-level events.
Suppose, as seems likely, that these assumptions are correct. Given the pres-
ence of indeterministic processes in the course of evolutionary history, there is a
real sense in which history could have taken diﬀerent paths. But then it seems
that God could not have ensured that history actually took the particular path
it did (a path involving homo sapiens). Given that God creates things with the
capacity to act indeterministically, and given that God allows them to be in situ-
ations in which they can exercise that capacity, God cannot ensure a particular
evolutionary outcome.
Or so it might seem, depending on what we mean by a ‘particular’ evolutionary
outcome. It is true that if God indeed creates things with the capacity to act
indeterministically, and allows them to be in situations in which they can exercise
that capacity, then God cannot ensure, just by willing it, that history takes pre-
cisely a given individual path.27 It is within God’s power, however, to ensure
particular types of outcomes, in virtue of His ability to interact causally with the
world. If the course of evolution is proceeding in a way unacceptable to God, it is
open to Him to nudge it in a direction He wishes.28
Suppose God has this speciﬁc plan for the evolutionary process: He wants the
species homo sapiens to emerge within 5 billion years of the Earth’s formation.
Given divine omniscience, for any given time God will know the likelihood at
that time that this goal will be attained if He allows events to unfold according
to the ordinary course of nature. He will also know the likelihood of this goal
being attained given various causal contributions He could make which would
involve special divine action.29 Given divine omnipotence, it is within God’s
power to aﬀect the course of evolution in a number of diﬀerent ways, and at an
unimaginable number of points, and so to bring about His goal in one way or
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another. If God exists, He could ensure that homo sapiens emerges from the
evolutionary process in virtue of His willingness and ability to steer evolution
toward that end if need be.
Compare Peter Geach’s discussion of God’s control over the future in a world
where human beings have genuine freedom:
If man is a child of God with power over his own works then we must not view the
world as
A Checker-board of nights and days
Where Destiny with men for pieces plays.
Rather, God and man alike play in the great game. But God is the supreme Grand Master
who has everything under his control. Some of the players are consciously helping his
plan, others are trying to hinder it ; whatever the ﬁnite players do, God’s plan will be
executed; though various lines of God’s play will answer to various moves of the ﬁnite
players. God cannot be surprised or thwarted or cheated or disappointed. God, like some
grand master of chess, can carry out his plan even if he has announced it beforehand.
‘On that square,’ says the Grand Master, ‘I will promote my pawn to Queen and deliver
checkmate to my adversary’ : and it is even so.30
Geach’s contention is that, despite the fact that some of what happens is
genuinely up to us, God ensures certain outcomes in virtue of His great power
and knowledge. I suggest that we adapt this view from Geach’s context (in which
it is the indeterminacy involved in human freedom that is at issue) to the context
of contingency in evolution (in which microphysical indeterminacy aﬀecting the
course of evolution is at issue). My contention is that God has the ability to ensure
even the quite speciﬁc result that homo sapiens emerges from the evolutionary
process, in virtue of His willingness and ability to steer evolution toward that end
if need be. Suppose further that God not only has this ability, but in fact actually
intends to use it. That is, suppose that God has intended to ensure the emergence
of homo sapiens from the evolutionary process, via special divine action if
necessary. For lack of a better name, call this the chess-master view of God’s
providence over evolution.31,32 If tenable, this view defuses the Gouldian contin-
gency argument, since if it is correct, (1), (1a), and (1b) are all false.
The position I’m advancing is not Intelligent Design theory (ID). According to
ID, we now possess scientiﬁc evidence that certain features of organisms did not
come to be via an evolutionary process, but were directly constructed or designed
by some intelligent agent(s). I am not making this claim, nor am I claiming that
we have scientiﬁc evidence that God has intervened in the evolutionary process.
What I am asserting is this: for all we know, God might have intended homo
sapiens to some day be produced by an evolutionary process, and might have
been prepared to ensure this outcome via special divine action. Again, I am not
asserting that we have scientiﬁc evidence that:
(A) God intended homo sapiens to someday be produced by an
evolutionary process, and was prepared to ensure this outcome via
special divine action.
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I am instead merely claiming that (A) might be true. Nothing we know gives us
good reason to think (A) is false. Since (A) implies the falsity of (1a) and (1b), it
follows from the claim that (A) might be true that (1a) and (1b) might be false. But
then the Gouldian contingency argument contains a dubious premise. So if the
chess-master view is tenable, Gould’s argument fails.
Is the chess-master view tenable? There is no question that an omnipotent,
omniscient God could guide the course of evolution so as to ensure the emerg-
ence of homo sapiens, but would He? Has He? Potential objections to the chess-
master view involve: (a) claims that we have scientiﬁc evidence that God has not
acted in this way (guiding evolution in one direction rather than another), or (b)
worries that it is somehow inappropriate (scientiﬁcally or theologically) to think
that God might intend to do so.33 In what follows my intention is to falsify claims
that we have good reason to think God has not guided (or would not have guided)
evolution in any way.
A ﬁrst possible objection asserts that we have good scientiﬁc evidence against
the claim that God has guided evolution. (Precisely this assertion was made by a
biologist from the ﬂoor during the recent Terry Conference at Yale.34) The puta-
tive evidence concerns the spontaneity of mutations, and the fact that beneﬁcial
mutations are not statistically favoured over non-beneﬁcial mutations.35 So, for
example, when certain bacteria are placed in an environment in which a par-
ticular mutation would be beneﬁcial, it is not the case that the mutations which
actually occur are statistically biased in favour of that beneﬁcial mutation.
It’s not hard to see that these facts would count as evidence against the claim
that God has guided evolution only if the truth of that claim36 would lead us to
expect that God would act specially upon the particular organisms being studied.
But there is no reason to suppose that. Suppose that God has guided evolution by
means of special divine action at some number of points in the history of evol-
ution. This does not imply that God does so at all times and for all organisms, or
that God does so frequently, or even that God does so more than in an exceed-
ingly minute percentage of all mutations or similarly relevant events. Much less
does it suggest that God would be interested in tinkering with the organisms in
Luria and Delbruck’s petri dish. In general, experimental evidence regarding the
ordinary course of nature does not count as good evidence against the claim that
God occasionally causes some events to depart from the ordinary course of
nature.
What sort of evidence could plausibly be regarded as good evidence against the
claim that God has guided the course of evolution? An initial suggestion: suppose
we had complete knowledge of all the natural (i.e. created, non-divine) causes of
every mutation that ever occurred (and of all environmental changes, events in-
volving random genetic drift, and any other events similarly relevant to the course
evolution takes.) Further suppose that we could see that all such mutations and
other events had proceeded from their natural causes according to the ordinary
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laws of nature. Wouldn’t that count as good evidence that God was not guiding
the course of evolution?
Somewhat surprisingly, it wouldn’t. Let S be the total set of mutations and
other similarly relevant events, and let C be the set containing every natural cause
of every event in S. Earlier, we deﬁned an indeterministically produced event as
an event that is caused but not guaranteed by its causes. Now consider a distinct,
though related, notion: let a naturally indeterministically produced event be an
event that is caused, but that is not guaranteed by its creaturely causes. A naturally
indeterminisitically produced event might or might not be an indeterministically
produced event simpliciter, depending on whether God determines its occur-
rence or leaves both its occurrence and non-occurrence open.
Now, either there are some naturally indeterministically produced events in S
or there are none. If there are none, then the grounds for believing (1) are removed
and the Gouldian contingency argument fails regardless of the tenability of the
chess-master view.37 So suppose there are. Take one such event, C1. Ex hypothesi,
we know all the natural causes of C1, and can see that C1’s following from its
causes is consistent with the ordinary course of nature. Given that C1 is a naturally
indeterministically produced event, however, it remains the case that the natural
causes of C1 did not guarantee that it occurred. It might have been the case,
consistent with the laws of nature, that all the natural causes of C1 occurred but C1
not have occurred. Since we cannot rule out that God exerted a causal inﬂuence
to bring about C1 rather than some other nomologically possible event, we cannot
rule out that God was active in guiding the course of history towards C1. More
generally, in a world that appears indeterministic to us, we will never be able to
say that God is not acting specially to guide the outcomes of indeterministic
processes in one direction rather than another. So even if we could some day
obtain the utterly unrealistic level of knowledge about the causal history of
evolution described above, we still would not be in a position to say that we had
good evidence that God did not guide evolution.
It’s worth noting that God might not need to do anything dramatic to guide the
course of evolution. In fact, it seems entirely possible that God could direct the
course of evolution in a way so subtle as to be de facto undetectable to empirical
science.
Suppose, as has been suggested, that ‘genetic mutation can be induced by a
variety of quantum mechanical transitions’.38 Then God could bring about the
occurrence of certain mutations merely by making some quantum events come
out one way rather than another.39 It strains credibility to think that we will ever
be in a position to determine whether, say, a given quantum event occurring
millions of years ago came about according to the ordinary course of nature or via
special divine action. If God occasionally selects one from among many physi-
cally possible outcomes of certain quantum events, there is no reason to think
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that we would ever be able to detect this empirically. Thus, it seems possible that
God could direct the course of evolution in a way de facto undetectable to us.
Even if we do not have experimental evidence against the claim that God has
guided evolution, we do have, according to a second objection, a diﬀerent
scientiﬁc reason to reject the chess-master view of God’s providence: our ability
to do science well will be compromised if we hold that God has guided (or was
prepared to guide) the course of evolution via special divine action.40 According to
evolutionary biologist Michael R. Rose,
If an omnipotent creature [sic, read ‘creator’] can intervene in events in the known
universe, then there is no reason to suppose that any law of science will necessarily
remain constant. Indeed, to the extent to which the processes under scientiﬁc study are
subject to divine intervention, they become unsuited to further scientiﬁc study at all.41
In a similar vein, Nobel-Prize-winning physicist Steven Weinberg writes, ‘[T]he
only way that any sort of science can proceed is to assume that there is no divine
intervention and to see how far one can get with this assumption.’42
On this view, a belief that God has guided evolution (or was prepared to guide
evolution) is anti-scientiﬁc, because God’s doing so would require that God oc-
casionally bring about eﬀects outside of the ordinary course of nature, and if we
believe God may occasionally bring about eﬀects outside the ordinary course of
nature, our ability to do sciencewellwill be compromised. The crucial claimhere is
(6) If we believe God may occasionally bring about eﬀects outside the
ordinary course of nature, our ability to do science well will be
compromised.
The worry is that a belief in occasional divine intervention will undercut one’s
motivation or ability to engage in at least some of the practices which facilitate
scientiﬁc discovery. Rose provides an example to motivate this line of thought:
Let us suppose that a particular theory of superconductivity requires that a given alloy
have a particular electrical resistance of 10 K. If that resistance is being measured in a
laboratory at 3:15 pm on a Tuesday and the result is not what was expected by the theory,
then a creationist scientist could say, simply, that God must have intervened to change
the alloy so as to get the observed result. The alternative, which a noncreationist would
be forced to embrace, is to admit that the original theory is wrong. … This is the essential
clash between science and nonscience. With the latter, there is always room to move
about to avoid accepting any evidence indicating that you, or your favored ideas, are
wrong.43
Rose’s example suggests the following argument for (6). Where a theory T
makes a prediction P, and we observeyP,
(7) If we believe God may occasionally bring about eﬀects outside the
ordinary course of nature, then we are able to say, ‘God must have
intervened to bring aboutyP.’
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(8) If we are able to say, ‘God must have intervened to bring aboutyP’,
then we will have a good reason to ignore the evidence against T that
our observation provides.
(9) If we have a good reason to ignore the evidence against T that our
observation provides, then our ability to do science well will be
compromised.
Hence, (6).
To evaluate this argument, consider (8). Suppose that John is a staunch advo-
cate of theory T, who also happens to believe that there is no God (or anything like
God), and who believes that nature as a whole is a closed causal system. Suppose
John himself does the experiment to test theory T. Confronted with the obser-
vation that yP, John is able to say, ‘A lab assistant from one of my rivals must
have tampered with my experiment, to bring aboutyP.’ But that of course does
not mean that it is reasonable for John to say this, or to give it any credence. From
the mere fact that John is able to say that a rival laboratory assistant must have
intervened, it does not follow that John has a good reason to ignore the evidence
against T that his observation of yP provides. Similarly, from the fact that S, a
believer in occasional divine intervention, is able to say that ‘God must have
intervened to bring about yP’, it does not follow that S has a good reason to
ignore the evidence against T. Thus, (8) is false. What is really at issue is whether
S’s belief in (the possibility of) occasional divine intervention provides a good
reason to think ‘God must have intervened to bring aboutyP.’
A defender of Rose’s position might therefore want to modify the argument
to get:
(7*) If we believe God may occasionally bring about eﬀects outside the
ordinary course of nature, then we have a good reason to believe
that God must have intervened to bring aboutyP.
(8*) If we have a good reason to believe that God must have intervened
to bring aboutyP, then we will have a good reason to ignore the
evidence against T that our observation provides.
(9) If we have a good reason to ignore the evidence against T that our
observation provides, then our ability to do science well will be
compromised.
Hence, (6).
(8*) may be acceptable, but now (7*) is false. The belief that God may oc-
casionally bring about eﬀects outside the ordinary course of nature does not
provide a good reason to believe that God must have intervened in this particular
instance. Indeed, the belief in the possibility of occasional divine intervention
provides practically no warrant at all for any claim of the form ‘God has inter-
vened at this particular point in space and time’. An analogy: imagine that John
believes that, in the past, it has very occasionally occurred that one scientist’s
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experiment has been tampered with by someone else. That belief by no means
gives John a good reason to believe that someone must have tampered with his
experiment to bring aboutyP. The case is the same for the believer in occasional
divine intervention.
Perhaps we can ﬁnd a better argument for (6) based on Rose’s assertion that, ‘ If
an omnipotent creature [sic, read ‘‘creator’’] can intervene in events in the known
universe, then there is no reason to suppose that any law of science will necess-
arily remain constant. ’44 This assertion is equivalent to
(10) If an omnipotent God can intervene in events in the known
universe, then there is no reason to suppose that any law of science
will necessarily remain constant.
This seems true, given that what is meant is that there is no reason to believe that,
necessarily, every law is exceptionless throughout space and time. That is, I think
we should grant (10) if we take it as meaning:
(10a) If an omnipotent God can intervene in events in the known
universe, then there is no reason to believe that ‘Necessarily,45
no law of science ever admits of an exception’.
One could, however, believe that an omnipotent God can intervene in events in
the known universe, and still have a reason to believe that, for a given law of
science L, ‘L holds almost all of the time’.
Suppose, for instance, that Ken believes that an omnipotent God can intervene
in the course of natural events. Ken, being knowledgeable in the ways of science,
will be aware of the considerable inductive evidence that the laws of science have
held almost all of the time in the past.46 Being rational, he will have a belief in the
uniformity of nature, i.e. the belief that the regularity we have observed in the past
will continue in the future. He will therefore have a good reason to think that the
laws of science will hold almost all of the time. Kenmay think that things can (and
even do) go diﬀerently on rare occasions, but that does not constitute a defeater
for his belief that the laws hold almost all of the time. Given his inductive evidence
about the regularity of nature, he will probably think that God has chosen to let the
universe work according to the laws of nature almost all of the time. What is more,
Kenmight even have an additional reason to believe in the constancy of the laws, a
reason unavailable to the atheist : he might believe that God has good reason to
create an regular, orderly world, and for that reason he might well expect that the
laws will hold almost all of the time. So it’s incorrect that, if one believes an
omnipotent God can intervene, then onemust have no reason to believe that, for a
given law of science L, ‘L holds almost all of the time’. Thus it is false that,
(10b) If an omnipotent God can intervene in events in the known
universe, then there is no reason to believe that, for a given law of
science L, ‘L holds almost all of the time.’
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Can we build an argument for (6) out of Rose’s assertion, (10)? If (10b) were
true, we could go on to give a good argument for (6) by asserting:
(11b) If we have no reason to believe that, for a given law of science L,
‘L holds almost all of the time,’ then our ability to do science well
will be compromised.
But as we’ve seen, (10b) is false. We might therefore try:
(10a) If an omnipotent God can intervene in events in the known
universe, then there is no reason to believe that ‘Necessarily, no
law of science ever admits of an exception’.
(11a) If there is no reason to believe that ‘Necessarily, no law of science
ever admits of an exception’, then our ability to do science well
will be compromised.
Hence,
(12) If an omnipotent God can intervene in events in the known
universe, then our ability to do science well will be compromised,
which is more or less equivalent to (6).
The problem with this argument is that (11a) is entirely unmotivated. Suppose
Joan has no reason to believe that all laws of science are necessarily exceptionless.
Suppose, in fact, that Joan does not believe that ‘Necessarily, no law of science
admits of an exception’. How does it follow that Joan’s ability to do science well
will be compromised? If Joan believes that all laws of science hold almost all of
the time, then she can carry out her scientiﬁc projects with conﬁdence that the
laws hold for the processes she studies. In cases where some experimental result
disconﬁrms one of her theories, she will realize that, say, divine intervention in
her laboratory is just exceedingly less likely than amistake in experimental design,
measurement error on her part, or the falsehood of her favoured theory. So Joan
will be under no pressure to ignore relevant evidence (or, if she is, it won’t be
because of her belief in the possibility of occasional divine intervention).
What is more, Joan may hold the common belief, among theists, that God
desires that human beings come to understand the nature of the physical world
He has created. And if she believes that, then she’ll have a reason to think God
would not intervene in her (or other people’s) experiments. We can see why God
might engage in special divine action to perform a miracle which conﬁrms some
message God wants conﬁrmed, and we can see why God might engage in special
divine action if doing so was necessary to bring about the existence of rational
animals. But why would God want to interfere with the increase in human
knowledge about His creation? There’s reason to think God wouldn’t want that.
So not only does Joan lack a reason to think God has intervened in a given ex-
periment, she could also have a positive reason to think He has not. All that to say,
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(11a) appears false, and is at any rate unestablished. In the absence of a good
argument for (11a), the argument culminating in (12) remains unconvincing.
As another way of supporting (6), we might work with Weinberg’s remark that
‘the only way that any sort of science can proceed is to assume that there is no
divine intervention and to see how far one can get with this assumption’.47 Here
Weinberg appears to be asserting that,
(13) In order for the branch or area of science studying X to proceed,
scientists studying X must employ the working assumption that
there is no divine intervention in X.
According to (6), the belief that God may occasionally bring about eﬀects out-
side the ordinary course of nature is detrimental to the ability to do science well.
If (13) is to be used as a premise in an argument for (6), that argument would have
to show that the belief that God may occasionally bring about eﬀects outside the
ordinary course of nature somehow leads to an inability to employ the working
assumption that there is no divine intervention in some particular area X. But a
scientist studying X who holds that God may occasionally bring about eﬀects
outside the ordinary course of nature could still realize the utility of operating on
the working assumption that there is no divine intervention in X, and could ac-
cordingly employ the working assumption that there is no divine intervention in
X. Such a scientist would not contravene anything said by (13) to be required for
the progress of science. So even if (13) is true, it looks as if it would be of little use
in an argument for (6).48
Upon inspection, it’s not surprising that good arguments for (6) are hard to
ﬁnd. After all, we have independent reason to think (6) is false: Pasteur, Newton,
Mendel and many others have both done science well and held the belief that
God may occasionally bring about events outside the ordinary course of nature.
So there seems to be no necessary connection between belief in the possibility (or
actuality) of occasional divine intervention and the ability to do science well. It
would indeed be detrimental to the progress of science to adopt the general
practice of believing that, if we do not have a convincing naturalistic explanation
for Y, then God must have brought about Y via special divine action. But this
practice is quite diﬀerent from a belief (most likely held on theological grounds)
in occasional divine intervention. There appears to be no good reason to think
that this belief is harmful to scientiﬁc progress.
Conclusion
It appears, then, that the Gouldian contingency argument fails on at least
two diﬀerent grounds. Contrary to the claims of Gould, Dennett, and others, it is a
mistake to think that what we have learned from evolutionary biology somehow
shows that human beings are mere accidents of natural history. Nor does what we
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know about the contingency of evolution give us good reason to reject the view
that human beings came to be according to a divine providential plan.49
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